Partial Information Games - Bayes Nash Equilibriums

March 28, 2024 · 2 minute read ·

In a nutshell

Key Ideas

Notes

Bathroom needs to be cleaned

No one wants to do it. If someone does it, both get a utility of 1 If no one does it, no one gets a utility Whoever does it incurs a cost

  Y N
Y 1-c1, 1-c2 1-c1, 1
N 1, 1-c2 0,0

A better example: Someone needs to call the electric company

Cost structure
  • For player 1
    • 1-c1 is known
    • c1 < 1/2
    • c1 is common knowledge
  • For player 2
    • c2 is low with probability < 1/2
    • c2 is high with probability 1-p
      • cost is more than ‘1’ (where 1 is the reward for the task)
    • Exact value of c2 is only known to player 2
Intuition

|P1|P2|u1|u2| ————- |X|X|+ve|eventually -ve| |X| |+ve|1| | |X|1|eventually -ve| | | |0|0|

More rigorous treatment

u2(s1, N|h) = 1-l >= 0 u2(s1, Y|h) = 1-h < 0

lemma 1: If c2=h -> s2(h)=N

u1(s2, Y) = 1-c1 > 1/2 u1(s2, N) = p*u1(s2(l), N) + (1-p)*u1(s2(h), N) = p*u1(s2(l), N) <= p*1 = p < 1/2

lemma 2: In BNE, player 1 plays Y

When P2’s type is l, they will still choose N.

Topic 1

Misc

  • It’s best to be more vocal about your procrastination / make it seem like you are less likely to do something than you actually would

Needs Exploration

Resources

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